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THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR WIRETAP
APPLICATIONS MADE CLEAR-
UNITED STATES v. GIORDANO
In United States v. Giordano,' the government, prosecuting for narcotic
violations, procured most of its evidence through the use of wiretaps. The
United States Attorney General's Executive Assistant had reviewed the
government's wiretap applications and subsequently appointed an Assistant
Attorney General to authorize the installation.2 The defense claimed that
the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because its procurement violated
section 2516(1) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968:
The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and such judge may grant in con-
formity with section 2518 of this chapter an order authorizing or approving
the interception of wire or oral communications by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, or a Federal agency having responsibility for the investiga-
tion of the offense as to which application is made, when such interception
may provide or has provided evidence of- . . . . [The statute then lists the
various offenses.]3
The defense alleged that the Attorney General erred in the delegation
of his authority to the Executive Assistant because the authorization pro-
cedure was not specifically sanctioned by section 2516(1). The govern-
1. 94 S. Ct. 1820 (1974).
2. A person authorizing a wiretap application reviews it and sanctions the
actions of wiretapping a certain telephone, home, etc. This is distinguishable from
the person who reviews the application and delegates the authority of authoriza-
tion to a subordinate by writing a designation memorandum.
The Executive Assistant to the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney
General are two separate and distinct positions.
3. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title III] outlines the au-
thorization procedures, the penalties and crimes involved with electronic surveillance,
and the immunity of witnesses. The defense claimed that since the government
violated § 2516(1) the evidence should be suppressed according to § 2515 which
states:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of
the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may
be received in evidence in any trial, . . . if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter.
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ment, however, contended that the Attorney General did not delegate
his authority, but remained responsible for 'the wiretap application, because
the Executive Assistant acted only as his alter ego. The appellate court4
affirmed the district court's 5 decision stating tha-t the alter ego argument
contravened the congressional intent behind section 2516(1), which pro-
vides for the placement of wiretap application authorization in an identifia-
ble person. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "Congress
did not intend the power to authorize wiretap applications ,to be exercised
by any individuals other 'than the Attorney General or an Assistant At-
torney General specially designated by him . .. .7
Giordano and its companion case, United States v. Chavez,8 resolved
two groups of conflicting decisions involving approximately one hundred
cases decided by lower federal courts.9 The conflict concerned the stand-
ards used to determine who may authorize a wiretap application before it
is submitted to a court for final approval. The authorization process
wherein the authorizing person is specifically identified is apparently in-
tended as a safeguard against 'the abusive use of wiretaps.' 0
The authorization conflict arose over the validity of the two basic pro-
cedures used by the Department of Justice for ,the authorization of wiretap
applications. The first procedure is the Giordano-type: a person with
the statutory authority granted in section 2516(1) (i.e., the Attorney
General) neither reviews nor sees the application form, but the Executive
4. 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972).
5. United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
6. The congressional intent behind Title III can be better viewed by looking at
the various statutes. Besides looking at § 2516(1), one should see if the identity of
the authorizing official can be ascertained from the submitted application or the
subsequently issued court order as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970) which
states:
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception
of a wire or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or
affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction and shall state the appli-
cant's authority to make such application. Each application shall include the
following information:
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making
the application, and the officer authorizing the application ....
(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire or
oral communication shall specify- .
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communica-
tions, and of the person authorizing the application.
7. 94 S. Ct. at 1823.
8. 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974).
9. For a listing of these cases see United States v. Robinson, 472 F.2d 973, 975
n.1 (5th Cir. 1973).
10. Judicial review is an additional safeguard.
Assistant signs a designation memorandum for him. Under a second pro-
cedure, the Attorney General reviews the application and signs the desig-
nation memorandum giving the Assistant Attorney General the authority
to authorize the tap, 'but a third person, a Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, signs the letter of authorization for the Assisant Attorney General."
The two arguments raised by the government in Giordano-type situa-
,tions are "alter ego" and "delegation.' 1 2 The government raised the same
two arguments in cases where the authorization procedure was similar to
Chavez, which empowered the Deputy Assistant Attorney General to sign
for the Assistant Attorney General. In addition, the government raised
a third and successful contention, that the act of signing by the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General was ministerial and unimportant in light of
the fact that the Attorney General personally reviewed the application.' 3
11. Since neither the Attorney General nor the Assistant Attorney General
reviewed the application in Giordano, the decisions at the Supreme Court and ap-
pellate court levels were based upon an analysis of the first procedure, while the
district court analyzed the second procedure.
12. The majority of cases in this first category have held that these two argu-
ments are invalid and thus the substitution of people violated the prescribed pro-
cedures of Title III and called for the suppression of the derived evidence: United
States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2628 (1974);
United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2604,
2622 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, af'd on rehearing (en banc),
472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Ill.
1972); United States v. Vasquez, 348 F. Supp. 532 (C.D. Cal. 1972); United States
v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. LaGorga, 340
F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Aquino, 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); United States v. Baldassari, 338 F. Supp. 904 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Cihal, 336 F. Supp. 261 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
As a result of the Giordano decision, two cases have been remanded on appeal to
the Supreme Court. United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated,
94 S. Ct. 2597 (1974); United States v. Pisacano, 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), va-
cated, 94 S. Ct. 2597 (1974). See also United States v. Mainello, 345 F. Supp. 863
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
13. The Attorney General personally reviewed the wiretap application, but there
was a controversy as to whether he actually authorized the wiretap application or
merely delegated the authority to his Assistant Attorney General to authorize it.
To illustrate this situation, one should look at the wiretap application forms used to
see if there was a designation or an actual authorization.
The designation memorandum sent to Will Wilson by Attorney General Mitchell
in part said:
Pursuant to the powers conferred in me by Section 2516 of Title 18, United
States Code, you are hereby specifically designated to exercise those powers
for the purpose of authorizing [specific name] to make the above-described
application.
This memo was signed "JNM" at the top by John Mitchell.
The Will Wilson letter of authorization stated:
Accordingly, you are hereby authorized, under the power specially delegated
to me in this proceeding by the Attorney General of the United States, the
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This Note will dissect and analyze the reasoning behind the alter ego and
delegation arguments presented in the Giordano decisions.
Title III was the result of a long ,recognized need for an effective device
to combat organized crime, particularly gambling and narcotics. 14  Wire-
tapping and other types of electronic surveillance were known to be ef-
fective, but Congress realized the existence of many inherent dangers in
the use of electronic surveillance.' 5 The constitutional issues of the right
to privacy and the "big brother" image of 1984 were hopelessly inter-
twined with -the issue of electronic surveillance. As a result, in 1934,
Honorable John N. Mitchell, pursuant to the power conferred on him by
Section 2516 of Title 18 United States Code, to make application to a judge
of competent jurisdiction....
/s/ Will Wilson
Assistant Attorney General.
In the various cases, Will Wilson did not sign the letters, instead his Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General Henry Peterson or Harold Shapiro or an unknown person signed
Mr. Wilson's name.
Even though the letters on their face clearly show a designation, most courts seem
to say that the Attorney General actually authorized the wiretap application, thereby
making the authorization proper. United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.),
rev'g sub nom. United States v. Casale, 341 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1972); United
States v. Consiglio, 342 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1972); United States v. Doolittle,
341 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. LaGorga, 340 F. Supp. 1397
(W.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. D'Amato, 340 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1972):
United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See also United States
v. Chavez, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974), where the Supreme Court agreed with the
majority circuits and upheld the wiretap procedure even though the wiretaps did
not comply with § 2518(1)(a),(4)(d). The court of appeals in Chavez held that
the signature of Will Wilson signed by his deputy deceived the court which issued
the wiretap order as to the identity of the authorizing official. The Supreme Court
in reversing the court of appeals stated that if the issuing court knew that the au-
thorizing official was actually Attorney General Mitchell instead of Will Wilson, the
wiretap would still have been issued. See United States v. Consiglio, supra at 560 n.7,
which said that this misidentification was not a "material fraud upon the Court" and
admitted the procured evidence.
14. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED
CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951);
114 CONG. REC. 14,767 (May 23, 1968).
15. See 1968 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2224; S. REP. No.
1304, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 383 (1940). For more general discussions pertaining to
the dangers of electronic surveillance see Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (dissenting opinions of
Justices Holmes and Brandeis). See also Note, Constitutional Law-Electronic Sur-
veillance and the Fourth Amendment: Warrant Required for Wiretapping of Do-
mestic Subversives, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 430 (1972); Note, Electronic Surveillance
and the Supreme Court: A Move Back?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV 806 (1972); Comment,
Electronic Surveillance: The New Standards, 35 BROOKLYN L REv. 49 (1968).
Congress made all electronic surveillance illegal. 16 It was not until 1968,
that Title III was passed, enabling law enforcement officials to use elec-
tronic eavesdropping devices under restricted circumstances and circum-
scribed procedures. 17
Giordano explicitly investigated the congressional intent behind Title
III. s The district court's decision in United States v. Focarile'9 had
previously concluded that Congress wanted the responsibility for each
wiretap and eavesdrop authorization to rest in an identifiable person. The
proposed forerunners of sections 2516 and 2518 of Title III can be traced
back to 1961 with the introduction of Senate Bill 149520 which stated,
inter alia, that the Attorney General or any officer of the Department of
Justice or any United States attorney authorized by ,the Attorney General
may in turn authorize an electronic surveillance.
Henry Miller, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department in 1961, recommended that the power
of authorization be confined in the Attorney General or any specially
designated Assistant Attorney General in order to "give greater assurance
of a responsible executive determination."'' 2 The Department of Justice
adopted Mr. Miller's recommendation and issued a letter to the Senate
urging the introduction of an amendment which restricted the number of
persons authorized to issue wiretap applications.2 2  In 1967, Professor
G. Robert Blakey, consultant to the President's Commission of Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, published a proposed bill con-
taining a requirement compelling the identification of the authorizing of-
ficer in each wiretap application.2 3 Later that year a bill was introduced
which required not only the identity of the authorizing officer to be set
forth in .the application, but also that the name be listed in the court
16. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), 2518 set forth the procedure for authorization of
wiretap applications; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(l)(a)-(g) limits the crimes for which sur-
veillance may be employed; 18 U.S.C. §H 2511(1), 2515, 2520 set forth the penalties
and consequences for violations of the set forth rules; and, 18 U.S.C. § 2512 makes
it illegal for a private person to intercept any wire or oral communications.
18. See also United States v. Chavez, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974), rev'g, 478 F.2d
512 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 175 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
19. 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972).
20. See Hearing on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, S. 1822 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961),
at 5.
21. Id. at 356.
22. Id. at 372.
23. 1967 TAsK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, app. C, at 80, 109.
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order.2 4  Further, Congress required a report of the wiretap application
and order to be filed with the Administrative Courts and Congress.2"
The finished statute contained three basic requirements: (1) the wiretap
authorization must be made by the Attorney General or a specially desig-
nated Assistant Attorney General; 26 (2) the identity of the authorizing
person must be listed in both the application and the court order; 27 (3)
the identity must be contained in a report 'to the Administrative Courts
and Congress. 28
Congress recognized the necessity for fixing responsibility in an identifia-
ble person and embodied the language of the 1961 Justice Department
recommendation in section 2516(1). A further example of congressional
intent is illustrated as follows:
Paragraph (1) [of section 2516] provides that the Attorney General, or
any Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice specifically
designated by him, may authorize an application for an order authorizing
the interception of wire or oral communications. This provision cen-
tralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process the
formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of electronic surveillance
techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility that divergent practices
might develop. Should abuses occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an
identifiable person. This provision in itself should go a long way in guaran-
teeing that no abuses will happen. 29
This determination of congressional intent in enacting electronic surveil-
lance legislation is the predominant issue in many wiretap cases.
In Giordano, the government was investigating the defendants for pos-
sible illegal activities in the sale of narcotics. The agents assigned to the
case30 thought that valuable evidence could be procured through elec-
tronic surveillance, particularly through the use of "pen registers" and tele-
phone wiretaps. 31  On October 16, 1970, the agents requested Attorney
24. See Senate Hearings on S. 300, S. 552, S. 580, S. 674, S. 675, S. 678, S. 798,
S. 824, S. 916, S. 917, S. 992, S. 1007, S. 1094, S. 1194, S. 1333, S. 2050 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. of the Judici-
ary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 77 (1967); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1970).
26. Id. § 2516(1).
27. Id. § 2518(1)(a), (4)(d).
28. Id. § 2519.
29. 1968 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL & ADMIN. NEWS, S. REP. No. 1097, at
2112, 2185.
30. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
31. A "pen register" is a device which registers telephone numbers called from a
certain phone but does not intercept the conversations or even tell if the call was
completed. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1036-38 n.1 (D. Md.
1972); United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966). Since
General John N. Mitchell to authorize the wiretaps. Pursuant ito estab-
lished Department of Justice procedures, the Executive Assistant to the
Attorney General, Sol Lindenbaum, reviewed the request because Mr.
Mitchell was out of town. The Executive Assistant then wrote a
memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson specially desig-
nating him to authorize the wiretap application under section 2516(1).
On the belief that the Attorney General would have personally taken the
same action, Mr. Lindenbaum signed Mitchell's initials, instead of his
own, to the designation memorandum.3 2
The application was reviewed by an attorney and -the Chief and Deputy
Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Criminal
Division of the Justice Department and then forwarded to Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General Shapiro. 33  In addition, an unknown party signed
Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson's name on the letter of authoriza-
.tion.3 4
Subsequently, a court order was issued to permit the use of electronic
surveillance in compliance with the application that bore the initials of
Attorney General Mitchell and Will Wilson's signature. Mr. Mitchell and
Mr. Wilson had no personal knowledge of the application for this wiretap.
the arguments for the "pen register" are the same as for the telephone wiretaps,
only the wiretaps will be discussed.
32. There was also an application for the extension of time on the wiretap which
was personally approved by Attorney General Mitchell. Even though the extension
was properly authorized, its derived evidence would also be suppressed because of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d
57 (7th Cir. 1973) (two defendants were investigated for gambling violations as a
result of information received on previous improperly authorized wiretaps con-
cerning different defendants). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). However, if there remained sufficient inde-
pendent probable cause to issue the second wiretaps after the first wiretaps had been
suppressed, the evidence gained through the second wiretap need not be suppressed.
In other words, it is possible to have evidence independent of the tainted evidence
which can furnish probable cause for the second wiretap. See United States v.
lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 179 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
33. 340 F. Supp. at 1052.
34. Id. In many of the other cases it was known who signed Will Wilson's
name to the authorization letters. It was either Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Harold Shapiro or Deputy Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson acting under
the authority given to them by Will Wilson. See United States v. Roberts, 477 F.2d
57 (7th Cir. 1973) (Petersen signed an affidavit, Yee government's brief at 4);
United States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972) (Shapiro); United States v.
Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir. 1972) (Peterson). In fact the Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General signed most of the Title III applications and Will Wilson signed
hardly any, even though they all bear his name. Someone suggested during the
Giordano investigation of the unacknowledged letters that Will Wilson himself
signed the Giordano application and everyone present laughed. 469 F.2d at 524 n.3.
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The defendants were brought to 'trial and the district court35 suppressed
the evidence procured from -the wiretaps, finding the defendants not guilty.
The government subsequently appealed.
THE Alter Ego ARGUMENT
The defendants claimed that since neither the Attorney General nor the
Assistant Attorney General authorized -the application as required by sec-
tion 2516(1) the evidence procured was thereby inadmissible. 36 The
government contended ,that the procedure was legitimate because Sol
Lindenbaum acted as an alter ego of John Mitchell.a' The government
argued that because -the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General
worked closely with the Attorney General and became familiar with his
habits, standards and actions, he could with near certainty know which
way the Attorney General would decide any given situation and thus act
accordingly. Sol Lindenbaum approved the wiretap not because he
thought it was appropriate, but 'because, as Mr. Mitchell's alter ego, he
knew the Attorney General would think it was appropriate and approve
it. The government concluded that the responsibility was still vested in
Attorney General Mitchell. The government argued that since the re-
sponsibility still rested with Mitchell, the intent of Congress to have the
responsibility in an identifiable person was satisfied under this procedure.
The appellate court concluded that the government's argument failed
primarily because the alter ego theory obscured the identity of the re-
sponsible person. The court did not look at the government's contention
that Mr. Mitchell, by ratifying Mr. Lindenbaum's action, fulfilled the re-
quirements of a needed identifiable person. 8  The court took a different
approach concerning future activity in this area:
The premise is that future alter egos will always act within guidelines
created by the Attorney General and that future Attorneys General will
then always acknowledge responsibility for authorizations penned in their
names. Our concern here is not primarily with past action of a former
Attorney General, but rather the future consequence of sanctioning an
alternative scheme which could be abused hereafter to evade the congres-
sional policy of locating responsibility for wiretap applications with the
Attorney General and a limited number of his designated assistants. If we
should accept the Government's reasoning, there can be no assurance that
in some future case, if the particular wiretap authorization proved politically
embarassing, the Attorney General would not then repudiate his "Linden-
35. 340 F. Supp. 1033 (1972).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
37. 469 F.2d at 526.
38. Id. at 528.
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baum." The Attorney General would always be able to say with the
benefit of hindsight that the subordinate had betrayed his confidence, acted
beyond the scope of his responsibility, and the actions taken were not those
of an agent.3 9
If the Executive Assistant or some other agent alleges -that he acted as an
alter ego of the Attorney General and the Attorney General repudiates
the agent's action the identity of the responsible person becomes uncertain.
The desire of Congress to have an identifiable person responsible for the
wiretap is destroyed.
The court further stated that the alter ego theory destroys the purpose
of Congress' legislative intent which sought to centralize the wiretapping
authority because such a theory permits nearly everyone to act on the
Attorney General's behalf.
It need not stop with Lindenbaum, but could be extended with an equal
claim of validity to anyone within or without the Department of Justice.
In determining who qualifies as an alter ego, it would permit sidestepping
the congressional mandate fixing the level of those who may be designated
to authorize applications. 40
The appellate court found that the alter ego theory subverts congres-
sional intent in three other ways. 41  First, Congress wanted the re-
sponsible person subject to the scrutinization of the "political process. '"42
The Executive Assistant is not subject to this process; he need not be
approved by the Senate but rather he is appointed by the Attorney Gen-
eral.43 Secondly, the government alleged that even if the procedure was
not technically correct, the procedure used created a uniform policy with
just as many safeguards. 44 The court stated that -the procedure does not
have the statutory safeguards, and consequently violated the separation of
powers theory. 45 The court further stated that Congress intended a certain
procedure and it is not up to the Executive Branch to create another, no
matter how flawless or superior it may be. Congress clearly stated that
no other deviate practice should flourish.46 In addition, the government
pointed out that the proliferation of wiretap applications has made it im-
possible for the Attorney General to personally review each one; there-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 527-29.
42. Id. at 527. See also 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1057. "Political process" means
subject to approval by the Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (1970).
43. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.6 (1973).
44. 469 F.2d at 528.
45. Id.
46. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2185 (1968).
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fore, the Executive Assistant should be allowed to act as his alter ego.
The appellate court found that -the government's contention violated the
common rule of statutory construction, that the enumeration of certain
people implies an exclusion of all others.47  Section 2516(1) states that
-the Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General
may authorize the application. In accordance with this provision, the ap-
pellate court held that an Assistant Attorney General may act as the At-
torney General's alter ego; however, by this congressional scheme of
enumeration, the Executive Assistant cannot.
THE DELEGATION ARGUMENT
The government did not relinquish on this last point of statutory con-
struction, but insisted that the Executive Assistant was not only a qualified
alter ego, but that the Attorney General could delegate his authority to the
Executive Assistant. The government contended that 28 U.S.C. § 510
allows the Attorney General to delegate to any other officer any of his
functions including those of section 2516 (1 ).48
Affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court based its decision
on a delegation theory, instead of addressing itself to the alter ego theory.
It held that section 2516(1) limited the delegation power authorized by
section 510. The Court further illustrated this by searching into the
legislative history of Title III.
47. 469 F.2d at 529; Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942);
Ginsburg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970) states:
The Attorney General may from time to time make such provisions as he
considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer,
employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the
Attorney General.
It may be noted that the alter ego and the delegation arguments are two mutually
exclusive alternate arguments. Under the alter ego argument, the Attorney General
stays fully responsible for any actions done under his name; while under the delega-
tion argument, he is allowed to delegate both his authority and his responsibility.
See United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 504 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S.
Ct. 2628 (1974).
The government claimed the delegation process is a necessity because of the great
number of applications. But in United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189, 194 (5th
Cir. 1972), the court refused to bend and said that Congress must pass legislation
to relieve the Attorney General of his overload. In United States v. Narducci, 341
F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court recognized (1) that Congress can
pass legislation to relieve the Attorney General and (2) that the Attorney General
can delegate his authority to an Assistant Attorney General. Both ways relieve the
overload and do not violate any statutes.
236 [Vol. 24
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Other cases such as United States v. Robinson49 and United States v.
Pisacano5° have clearly pointed out the opposing viewpoints of the delega-
tion argument. Robinson is a case with virtually the same facts as
Giordano, the chief factual distinction being that the identity of the per-
son who signed Will Wilson's name to the authorization letter was known.
Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's conviction and
suppressed the derived evidence. The court concluded that section 2516
(1) was a limitation on section 510 since section 510 existed before sec-
tion 2516(1).51 The court reasoned that the supplemental words "or
any specially designated Assistant Attorney General" would have been
surplusage if delegation was allowed.
On the other hand, the appellate court in Pisacano upheld the validity
of such wiretaps on the basis of the delegation argument. In Pisacano,
the defendants pleaded guilty to gambling violations 52 before realizing that
the evidence obtained which caused them to plead guilty might have been
tainted because of the wiretap procedure used. The procedure was the
same as that used in Robinson. However, the court of appeals upheld
the guilty pleas on the grounds that the wiretap was properly authorized.
Without specifically referring to 28 U.S.C. § 510, the court stated that if
Congress did not mean to delegate authority, it would have expressly said
so in the statute. 53  To prove this point, the court cited section 101 of
the Civil Rights Act of 196854 passed during the same term as the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Section 101 of the Civil
Rights Act states that the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral may act only in accordance with this section and the "function of cer-
tification may not be delegated." By implication, the court reasoned that
18 U.S.C, § 2516(1) may authorize delegation of power because explicit
words limiting the delegation are missing in the statute. The Supreme
49. 468 F.2d 189 (1972), aff'd on rehearing (en banc), 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1973).
50. 459 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2597 (1974).
51. 468 F.2d at 192.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1084, transmission of wagering information by wire communica-
tion in interstate commerce; and 18 U.S.C. § 1952, transportation in the aid of
racketeering.
53. 459 F.2d at 263.
54. Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 245(a)(1) (1970) states:
No prosecution of any offense described in this section shall be undertaken
by the United States except upon certification in writing of the Attorney
General or the Deputy Attorney General that in his judgment a prosecution
by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure sub-
stantial justice, which function of certification may not be delegated. [Em-
phasis added.]
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Court twisted the Pisacano argument around and used section 101 as an
example that Congress did not intend to have section 510 controlling and
thus allowed the Attorney General to freely delegate his duties. The
Supreme Court by giving section 2516(1) a fair reading concluded it
must be a limit on section 510.15
To further bolster the position held in Pisacano, the government in
Robinson56 supported its delegation argument by citing December 1968
Grand Jury v. United States57 which held section 510 to have broadened
18 U.S.C. § 2514.58 Under section 2514 a United States attorney can
apply for an order requiring a witness to testify "upon the approval of the
Attorney General." The government contended that if section 510 can
be applied to section 2514, it can also be applied to section 2516(1).
The Robinson court distinguished the two statutes on a conceptually
weak basis. It found that two different "gravities" were involved; that
section 2514 does not approach the constitutional significance of section
2516(1).59 Robinson held that Congress was dealing with two separate
problems and concluded that while section 2514 could allow delegation,
section 2516(1) could not go beyond the terms of the statute.
The government's analogy between sections 2514 and 2516(1) can be
held invalid by analyzing the concept of statutory construction. United
States v. Aquino,60 using the same statutory construction argument as the
appellate court did in Giordano, applied this concept to the delegation
argument. Aquino, a case suppressing wiretap evidence against alleged
gambling violators, stated that section 2516(1) has supplemental words
which act as an outer limit to the delegation power, while section 2514
does not have any words which preclude the inclusion of any people not
specifically mentioned. 61
The rule of statutory construction, in addition to distinguishing the two
sections 2514 and 2516(1) seems to cause the confusion in the first place.
Does 2516(1) by statutory construction act as a limit upon 510 or does
510 broaden 2516(1)? The majority of the courts, including the Su-
55. 94 S. Ct. at 1826.
56. 468 F.2d at 193.
57. 420 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
58. Section 2514 provides that "such United States Attorney, upon approval of
the Attorney General, shall make application to that court that the witness shall be
instructed to testify or produce evidence ...... The statute grants immunity to the
witness on such procured evidence.
59. 468 F.2d at 193.
60. 338 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
61. Id. at 1083.
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preme Court, in reviewing the legislative history of Title III have con-
cluded the former is the correct answer. The Pisacano appellate court
looked for an explicit indication of intent by Congress to deny further
delegation. The legislative history of Title III and its predecessors does
not clearly reveal any statement that would resolve this doubt. The late
Senator Thomas Dodd, who introduced one of the earlier proposed bills,
made one statement about confining the delegation power:
As for the authority S.1495 would lodge directly in the Attorney General,
I point out that he must act personally, and cannot act through a delegee;
and that he must act under promulgated rules and regulations, which will
be open to scrutiny by the Congress and by the public.62
However, a question arises as to whether Senator Dodd was referring to
the corresponding section of 2516(1), since his bill was differently worded
and seven years had elapsed until the passage of Title III.
Nevertheless, if one looks at the intent of Congress to have a readily
identifiable person subject to the political process, it must be seen that
,the Executive Assistant is not a qualified person. The government main-
tained that delegation to the Executive Assistant provided for a readily
identifiable person and centralized authority. The first case to confront
,this argument, United States v. Narducci,6 3 where the court suppressed the
wiretap evidence used against the defendants charged with conspiracy and
gambling violations, claimed it proved too much. That is, section 510
would allow delegation -to anyone in the department which therefore de-
stroys any centralization of authority and is clearly inconsistent with Con-
gressional intent.64
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Supreme Court in Giordano stated that
it appears wholly at odds with the scheme and history of the Act to con-
strue § 2516 to permit the Attorney General to delegate his authority at
will, whether it be to his Executive Assistant or to any officer in the De-
partment other than an Assistant Attorney General. 65
The appellate court found that the court which issued the wiretap order
and the investigating agents were deceived by improper authorizations.
Other cases, while upholding the wiretap authorization, criticized the gov-
62. Hearings on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, S. 1822 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 450
(1961).
63. United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
64. Contra, United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
65, 94 S. Ct. at 1830,
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ernment's failure to adhere to the provisions of Title 111.6 6 Some courts,
particularly the ninth circuit, have strongly criticized the government's tac-
tics and suppressed the evidence of the wiretap if the authorization did not
strictly adhere to Title III's provisions. 67 While the Supreme Court did not
take the strict viewpoint handed down by the ninth circuit, it refused to al-
low the procedures to deviate substantially from those proscribed.
The courts' efforts to keep wiretaps under strict control should not be
surprising. Many years ago the court was called on to prevent and correct
any deviations from the prescribed methods. Congressmen supported the
passage of Title III with the understanding that there would be "strict
court supervision."68 In his earlier bill, Senator Dodd placed the re-
sponsibility in the lap of the courts in an effort to insure that any standards
applicable to them shall be maintained. 69 The courts took the responsibil-
66. See United States v. Chavez, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974); United States v. Becker,
461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972).
67. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1973). The govern-
ment in order to keep the evidence from being suppressed contended the spirit, if not
the letter, of the law was followed. The government claimed it had in good faith set
up a procedure which exceeded the requirements of Title III. Since it was in good
faith, there was no need to apply the drastic remedy of suppression because of a
simple technical mistake. Giordano and King rejected this argument, because they
rejected the premise that the mistake was technical.
United States v. King, supra at 504, further rejected the contention that the
government acted in good faith because the letters of authorization and memoranda
were drawn exactly as the statute prescribed. The applications were deliberately
made to mislead the court.
The government also contested the suppression of evidence by contesting the
constitutionally debated and judicially made exclusionary rule or "fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine." But in Giordano and in United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp.
1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the courts pointed out that the government's arguments
were misplaced. The rule here is not a constitutional question at all, but a separate
statutory matter which the courts are obligated to follow. Section 2515 specifically
states the suppression is necessary if disclosure is "in violation of this chapter."
This wording (see note 3 supra) dispels another of the government's various con-
tentions based on § 2518(10) (a) which states:
Any aggrieved person in any trial . . .may move to suppress the contents
of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived there-
from, on the grounds that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted.
The government contended the technical violation is not "unlawful," and that, there-
fore, the defendant could not move to suppress the evidence. United States v. Nar-
ducci, supra at 1116, quickly dispelled this by looking just at the wording of § 2515
and gave "unlawful" a broader definition.
68. See, e.g., 1968 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL & ADMIN. NEWS, Individual Views
of Sen. Eastland, 2270.
69. Hearings on S. 1086, S. 1221, S. 1495, S. 1822 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 450 (1961):
My reply is that the legislative branch of Government must, in the nature
of our system, leave it to the appellate courts to correct the judicial errors of
ity and explained why. Judge Becker in Narducci succinctly elaborated:
[Ihe necessity for strict compliance with the statute in a wiretap situation
stems just as much from the precedent setting example of condoning laxity
in years to come, with serious consequences to personal liberties, as from
concern over the rights of the accused in a given case.70
The government cleverly argued its case, not for the promotion of so-
cietal order or for respect of the law, but for the expediency of the
moment. 71  In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,72 Justice
Brandeis warned:
Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill,
it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law. .... 73
The Supreme Court in affirming the appellate court which had suppressed
wiretap evidence seemed to adopt this view and attempted to put a stop to
the grosser of the two deviant practices used in authorizing wiretap appli-
cations by the Department of Justice.
74
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the lower courts and to ensure that the standards which legislation pre-
scribes for court action actually govern the courts.
70. United States v. Narducci, 341 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
71. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 506 (9th Cir. 1973).
72. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
73. Id. at 485.
74. The second practice involved in Chavez has since been conformed to the pro-
visions of Title III by redrafting the form letters which now point to the Attorney
General as the .authorizing official instead of the Assistant Attorney General.
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